COMMENT
ROBISON v. JOHNSON: VETERANS' EDUCATIONAL
BENEFITS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
The use of a conscripted army for the promotion of national
defense has raised at least two fundamental questions: (1) how to
compensate adequately those who are drafted for the resulting disruption of their lives, and (2) how to deal with those men subject
to conscription who are morally or ethically opposed to military
service. Congress has responded to the first question by supplementing
military pay with programs providing education, training and other
benefits to veterans of military service.' The second question, a far
more controversial one, has been resolved by excusing conscientious
objectors from service in the armed forces but requiring them to
perform alternate civilian service in the national interest.L2
In Robison v. Johnson,3 a class action on behalf of all conscientious objectors who have completed alternate service, a federal district
court in Massachusetts indicated that the framework constructed by
Congress to deal with these two questions is incomplete. Judge W.
Arthur Garrity held that the denial of educational benefits under the
Veterans' Readjustment Act of 19661 to conscientious objectors who
have completed alternate service constitutes a denial of equal protection in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.5
Judge Garrity declared that all conscientious objectors who have
satisfactorily completed two years of alternate service or who, after
completing 180 days of' such service, have been granted hardship
releases from such service, shall be eligible to receive veterans' educational benefits.'
In extending the statute to include conscientious objectors, the
court's holding stands as the ultimate acceptance of the principle of
judicial review. It is probably safe to say that no member of Congress
'38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1970).
250 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1970).
3352 F. Supp. 848 (D. Mass.), prob. juris noted, 93 S. Ct. 2274 (1973).
438 U.S.C. §§ 1651-97 (1970).
5 352 F. Supp. at 859. Contra, Hernandez v. Veterans Administration, 339 F. Supp.
913 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 467 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1972) cert. granted, 93 S. Ct.
2267 (1973).

Although the fifth amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, the
courts have employed equal protection analysis under the amendment's due process
clause. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6 352 F. Supp. at 861. The court chose this remedy based on its belief that had
Congress been confronted with the alternatives of nullification or extension, it would have
chosen the latter. Id.
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contemplated that conscientious objectors would be covered by the
Act, and that if the suggestion had been raised it would have been
flatly rejected.7 Judge Garrity's decision might, therefore, be decried
as an abuse of power by a fundamentally undemocratic institution,
or applauded as the judicial protection of a voiceless minority and
the reaffirmation of the fundamental value of equality in the face of
legislative abuse or oversight-in the words of Justice Stone, the
exercise by the judiciary of "the sober second thought.""
Arguing against judicial review is a purely academic exercise at
this point in the history of our legal development, but there is continuing debate over the proper restraints on the courts' exercise of
their power to declare legislation unconstitutional. Well aware of the
dangers of merely substituting their own judgment for the judgment of
the legislature, or of appearing to do so, courts have attempted to
develop reasoned principles for the constitutional evaluation of challenged legislation. We turn now to an analysis of the Robison court's
reasoning and alternative approaches to the question of veterans'
educational benefits for conscientious objectors.
I.

THE DENIAL OF BENEFITS TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
AS A DENIAL OF FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

In Robison, the plaintiffs claimed that the exclusion of conscientious objectors -from eligibility for educational benefits violated not
only their right to equal protection, but also their rights of free exercise
of religion. Judge Garrity rejected the free exercise claim,9 indicating
that the burden imposed by the exclusion was not substantial enough
to merit the application of the principles developed in the two leading
free exercise cases decided by the Supreme Court-Braunfeld v.
7

Although Congress did not restrict veterans' educational benefits to veterans of
the armed forces-officers of the Public Health Service and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration were included under the act's terms, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(21)
(B)-(C) (1970)-no mention was made in either committee report of veterans' benefits for conscientious objectors. The act was designed to temper the disruptive effect
of the nation's first "peacetime" draft on the lives of the chosen few. See SENATE Comm.
ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEI=ARE, COLD WAR VETERANS' READJUSTMNT ASSISTANCE

AcT,

S. R.E. No. 269, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. It was
intended to provide benefits to post-Korea veterans similar to the benefits provided for
veterans of World War II and the Korean conflict. For an account of the programs
established for veterans of these earlier wars, see HoUsE Comm. ON VETERNS' AFFAiRS,
H.R. REP. No. 1258, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1966).

8 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HAiv. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936).
For discussion of the pros and cons of judicial review, see A. BIcEEL, TIM LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-33, 258 (1962); JUDiCmA, REvI w An =E SUPimE COURT (L.
Levy ed. 1967); McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion,
3 Hous. L. REV. 354 (1966); Rostow, The Democratic Character Of Judicial Review,
66 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1952); Wright, The Role Of The Supreme Court In A Democratic
Society-Judicial Activism Or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1968).
9 352 F. Supp. at 859.
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Brown 0 and Sherbert v.Verner." These two decisions stand for the
proposition that a statute which places "any incidental burden on the
free exercise of .. .religion"' 2 is constitutional only if it is justified
by some compelling state interest 3 which cannot be served by means
which do not impose such a burden. 1 4 The Robison court's decision
not to apply this balancing test is a curious one, for the Sherbert Court
clearly spoke of weighing any burden on free exercise against the alleged state interest-not only those burdens which meet some minimum standard of objectionability.' 8 While the burdens on free exercise may be substantially less in Robison than in Sherbert,' the weight
of the burden should be a factor in determining the outcome of the
balancing test, not whether the balancing test should be applied.
Assuming the existence of some incidental burden in Robison,
the free exercise claim may be difficult to deny, for it is difficult to
find any compelling state purpose in the veterans' benefits program
which cannot be accomplished by including conscientious objectors.
Unlike the situation in Braunfeld, 7 granting relief to the Robison
plaintiffs would not defeat the state's purpose. If that purpose be compensation for military service or making the military more attractive,
it can be achieved whether or not conscientious objectors receive veterans' benefits.'" And if the purpose be treating military servicemen
more favorably than alternate servicemen, there would be a serious
10366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld, the Court upheld enforcement of a Sunday
closing law against the free exercise claim of one who suffered an economic burden by
virtue of his religious objection to working on Saturday. The Court found that the
state's interest in a uniform day of rest was a compelling one which could be served
only by prohibiting exceptions. Id. at 608.
11374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that the denial of unemployment compensation for refusal to accept a job which required Saturday work was an
unconstitutional denial of free exercise when the refusal was motivated by a religious
prohibition.
121d. at 403 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 403, 406.
14 366 U.S. at 607.
15
Text accompanying note 12 supra.
16 The Robison court distinguished Sherbert in two ways.
First, the denial [of veterans' benefits] is felt, not immediately, as in Sherbert,
but at a point in time substantially removed from that when a prospective conscientious objector must consider whether to apply for an exemption from military service. Secondly, the denial does not produce a positive economic injury
of the sort effected by a Sunday closing law or ineligibility for unemployment
payments.
352 F. Supp. at 860.
17 Note 10 supra.
18 For the reasons stated below, text accompanying note 37 infra, the inclusion
of conscientious objectors can be said to have a neutral effect on the purpose of making
military service more attractive. Note the different consequences of this neutral effect
under the first amendment compelling state interest test and the rational relation test
applicable in equal protection cases which involve neither suspect classifications nor
fundamental rights, text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.

1136

UNIVERSITY OF PENNVSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:1133

question whether that purpose is compelling enough to justify the
burden on free exercise of religion.19

But the application of a Sherbert balancing test to the question
of veterans' benefits for conscientious objectors involves problems
which suggest that the Robison court's reluctance to treat the case as
a free exercise case was not without justification. Robison is not simply
a case of a state-imposed economic burden attaching to religiouslydictated behavior. Military service, for which alternate service is the
substitute, entails its own well-recognized burdens, and, consequently,
alternate service might be viewed as bestowing relative benefits as
well as imposing burdens. The essential question in Robison is one of
equal treatment, and the necessary comparison of burdens and benefits
is better undertaken within the framework of equal protection than
within that of free exercise of religion. Nevertheless, the first amendment aspect of the-Robison plaintiffs' claim should not be disregarded.
The religious nature of the classification should be of central concern
to an equal protection analysis.
II.

THE DENIAL OF BENEFITS TO CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION

The Robison court held that the exclusion of conscientious objectors constitutes a denial of equal protection in violation of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, because the exclusion bears no
rational relation to the purpose of the Veterans' Readjustment Act."0
In so holding, the court departed from the dualistic approach characteristic of the Warren Court era. Under that dualistic approach, a
governmental action creating suspect classifications 2 ' or adversely
affecting fundamental interests 2 is subjected to scrutiny which is
19 Dictum in the recent case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), raises an
obstacle to the successful advancement of a free exercise claim. Chief justice Burger,
speaking for the Court, indicated that the first amendment protects only "religious"
beliefs-not "philosophical" or "personal" beliefs such as those which motivated Thoreau.
Id. at 215-16. The Supreme Court had previously held that the availability of the conscientious objector exemption could not be limited to those whose beliefs were religious
in the traditional sense-that moral or ethical beliefs could qualify a person for conscientious objector status if those beliefs were held with the strength of traditional
beliefs. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965). If the Court were to adopt the somewhat anomalous position that the
scope of beliefs protected by the first amendment is narrower than the scope of beliefs
which would qualify as religious under 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1970), the conscientious objectors' free exercise claim to veterans' benefits could be accepted only in some cases.
20352 F. Supp. at 856-59. This requirement that the exclusion bear a rational
relation to the purpose of the Act is a restatement of the definition of a reasonable
classification as "one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law." Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws,
37 CAnir. L. REv. 341, 346 (1949).
21
E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 22
(1944) (national ancestry).
E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation).
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Cc'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" (the compelling state interest
test), while other classifications receive "minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact" (the rational relation test).' Gerald
Gunther recently suggested that the Burger Court has shown signs of
discontent with two-tiered equal protection and has, through a number
of decisions upholding equal protection claims on rational relation
grounds, laid the foundation for a new, vigorous means-focused equal
protection which would be a preferred constitutional ground for a less
interventionist Court.24 The Robison court's holding is notable for
the rigor of its reasonable means inquiry, but, this Comment will
argue,25 a reasonable means inquiry is inadequate in a case like Robison. Some form of stricter scrutiny is appropriate, and perhaps necessary, to justify the Robison court's result.

A.

Application of the Rational Relation Test

Congress specified four purposes in enacting the Veterans' Readjustment Act:
(1) enhancing and making more attractive service in the
Armed Forces of the United States, (2) extending the benefits of a higher education to qualified and deserving young
persons who might not otherwise be able to afford such an
education, (3) providing vocational readjustment and restoring lost educational opportunities to those service men
and women whose careers have been interrupted or impeded
by reason of active duty.., and (4) aiding such persons in
attaining the vocational and educational status which they
might normally have aspired to and obtained had they not
served their country 2 0
The legislative history of this statute clearly indicates that Congress' overriding concern was with the disruptive impact of compulsory
military service on an individual's career. The Senate Committee Report noted that the draft has a "depressant effect on young men's employment potential," because employers are generally unwilling to
train men with unsatisfied military obligations.2 " In addition, "the
draft inject[s] into their lives numerous uncertainties which make
it impossible for them to plan ahead" and discourages them from
entering advanced training.' Most importantly, the Report concluded
23 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972). For a discussion of two-tiered equal protection, see Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 20, at 343-56; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. tv. 1065, 1076-132 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
24Gunther, supra note 23, at 18-24.
25
Text accompanying notes 37-75 infra.
26 38 U.S.C. §

27 S. REP.,

28Id.

1651 (1970).

supra note 7, at 8.
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that "today's servicemen drop farther and farther behind their civilian
contemporaries who generally pursue educational objectives, or enjoy
29
the higher wage scales and other economic advantages of civil life."
The Senate Committee specifically refused to limit eligibility to veterans who served in combat zones for the reason that "the philosophy
and purpose of the GI Bills is and has been to give readjustment
assistance to the veteran returning to civilian life ...and not to reward
him for the risk that he might have been exposed to."3
It was this purpose of "compensat[ing] veterans for the deprivation of educational and economic opportunities that inhere in military
service" 3' 1 which the Robison court found to be the primary one, expressed formally as purposes (2), (3) and (4). The court held that
veterans of military service and of alternate service are similarly
situated with respect to this purpose:
[Alternate servicemen] too were burdened at one time by an
unsatisfied military obligation that adversely affected their
employment potential; were forced, because of the draft law,
to forego immediately entering into vocational training or
higher education; and were deprived, during the time they
performed alternate service, of the opportunity to obtain educational objectives or pursue more rewarding civilian goals.32
This conclusion draws particular force from the stringent requirements of satisfactory alternate service. In addition to the statutory requirement that alternate service contribute to the maintenance
of the national health, safety or interest,33 conditions imposed by the
Selective Service System limit the range of acceptable work considerably. A Local Board Memorandum issued in 1962 set forth the following policy:
Whenever possible the work should be performed outside of
the community in which the registrant resides. The position
should be one that cannot readily be filled from the available
competitive labor force, or from civil service or merit registers of the Federal, State or local governments, and should
constitute a disruption of the registrant's normal way of life
somewhat comparable to the disruption of a registrant who is
inducted into the Armed Forces.3 4
29 Id. 10.
301d. 19. The Report also listed two other reasons for not limiting benefits to
combat veterans. Most servicemen cannot choose the area in which they serve, and
many cold war hot spots cannot be considered "areas of hostilities" in light of the United
States' foreign policy. Id.
31 352 F. Supp. at 858.
32 Id. at 858-59.
33 50 U.S.C. AP. § 456(i) (1970).
34 Selective Service System, Local Memorandum No. 64 f1 1 (March 1, 1962, rescinded, Feb. 8, 1972), in 4 SEL. SaRv. L. REP. 2183 (emphasis added).
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A 1969 Memorandum repeated this theme:
Always there must be an effort to see that the path of the conscientious objector in being processed for and performing
civilian work parallels as nearly as possible the path of the
I-A man in his processing for and performance of military
duty. Under this theory, the conscientious objector's pay
should be reasonably comparable to the pay, allowances
and other benefits received by the man inducted into the
Armed Forces; and his assignment should be beyond commuting distance from his home.3 5
In light of these requirements, it is difficult to deny that alternate
service disrupts the conscientious objector's career to the same extent
that military service disrupts the serviceman's career, and that, at
least with respect to the purpose of compensating veterans for interference with their career plans, the two groups are similarly situated3
The goal of making military service more attractive is not so
easily disposed of. The Robison court claimed that a finding of a
rational relation between this goal and the exclusion of conscientious
objectors who had performed alternate service would require one of
two assumptions: first, that if benefits were available to alternate
servicemen, many persons who would enter the military under the
statute as written would choose alternate service instead; or, second,
that if benefits remained unavailable to alternate servicemen, some
persons who were conscientiously opposed to military service would
be willing to join the military to obtain educational benefits. The court
dismissed both propositions as untenable in light of the safeguards that
exist for ensuring that persons seeking conscientious objector status are
sincere, and the strength of conviction of those who are in fact conscientious objectors27
It is clear that neither the inclusion nor the exclusion of conscientious objectors affirmatively promotes the government's interest
in making military service more attractive. The Robison court seemed
35

Selective Service System, Local Memorandum No. 98 ff 2 (Sep. 11, 1969, rescinded, Nov. 10, 1971), in 4 SE.. Saxv. L. REP. 2200:7 (emphasis added). The requirements contained in Memoranda Nos. 64 & 98 are codified in 32 C.F.R. § 1660.6
(1972). As the Robison court noted, 352 F. Supp. at 851, the imposition of criteria beyond that of contributing to the national health, safety or interest has been severely

criticized by some. E.g., Silard, Invalid Disruption Rules for CO Alternate Service, 3
Co

mr. SuRv. HUM. RIGHTs L. 136 (1971).

36 It might be objected that the similarity of conditions does not require the inclusion of an excluded group. Courts have often defended underinclusive classifications

on the ground that the legislature should be free to remedy part of an evil. See, e.g.,
XWilliamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). But this ground for tolerating underinclusive
classifications is absent, or at least weakened, in cases involving the. bestowal of benefits,
in which the excluded group, protests its exclusion. For a discussion of the equal protection treatment of underinclusive legislation, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20,
at 348-51; Developments, supra note 23, at 1084-86.
37 352 F. Supp. at 857.
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to require that the exclusion affirmatively promote Congress' purpose.
But no such requirement is included in the rational relation test of the
validity of a classification; that test is met if the classification "includes all who are similarly situated" with respect to the purpose of the
law. 8 If the inclusion of one group promotes a purpose and the inclusion of a second group does not, the two groups can hardly be said
to be similarly situated with respect to that purpose. 39 To insist on the
inclusion of the second group would be to require that Congress include
not only all groups whose inclusion would promote the legislative
purpose, but also all groups whose inclusion would not obstruct that
purpose. The unreasonableness of such an approach to equal protection is self-evident; it might require in this case that not only conscientious objectors but also the physically unfit be included, because the
inclusion of the physically unfit would not obstruct any of Congress'
goals.
Limiting the availability of educational benefits to veterans of
military service does bear a rational relation to the goal of making
the military service more attractive,40 and a classification which is
valid with respect to one of several permissible purposes of an act
does not fall, according to traditional rational relation analysis. 41 If
the exclusion of alternate servicemen is to fall, it must do so by virtue
of the application of some stricter standard of review.
B.

The Appropriateness of Heightened Scrutiny

As has been suggested, an equal protection analysis which fails to
consider the religious nature of the classification in question is inadequate 4 2 The preferred position traditionally accorded the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion suggests that classifications
based on religion should be subjected to a higher standard of review
than the rational relation test. As the Supreme Court recently noted,
"The Equal Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First
Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives. ' 43 The case for some form of heightened scrutiny-whether in
the form of the compelling state interest test applied to classifications
38 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20, at 345.

a9 See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20, at 343-46; Developments, supra note 23,
at 1076.
40

It is arguable that the inclusion of veterans of the Public Health Service and the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration supports the contention that Congress' purpose was not to make the military service more attractive. But the inclusion of
these groups probably indicates that Congress intended to make these services more attractive as well. The challenged classification bears no stronger relation to this supplemental purpose than it did to the purpose as it was originally stated.
41See Gunther, supra note 23, at 47 ("subsidiary purposes may also support the
rationality of a means"); Developments, supra note 23, at 1077-84.
42
Text accompanying note 19 supra.
43 Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972).
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involving fundamental interests or suspect classifications,44 or some
other standard-is particularly strong in a case which, like Robison,
involves the distribution of important benefits.
The Robison court expressed doubts about the application of the
compelling state interest test,45 but concluded that some "form of
heightened, if not strict, scrutiny" may be justified by the fact that
"the undeniable effect of this legislation is to deny important benefits
to a discrete minority."4' 6 The court suggested two possible approaches:
"some form of balancing of the interests involved," or "plac[ing] on
the defendants the burden of showing a high degree of relevancy between the exclusion ...

and the stated purpose ....

"4

But the court

added that "the fashioning of such rules is better left to appellate
courts" and found it "unnecessary to attempt the exercise" because
it held the exclusion did not even bear a rational relation to the legislative purpose.48 Since, as this Comment has suggested,4 9 the exclusion
of conscientious objectors does withstand challenge under the rational
relationship standard of review, the Supreme Court is faced with the
task of deciding which heightened standard of review may be appropriate.
1. The Compelling State Interest Test:
Suspect Classifications
The starting point for this task is an evaluation of the Robison
court's unwillingness to apply the compelling state interest test. The
exclusion of conscientious objectors cannot withstand this test because
the exclusion is not necessary" to the accomplishment of the state's
purpose. However, this test is reserved for cases involving fundamental
interests or suspect classifications, and the Robison court failed to
find either of these in the denial of veterans' benefits to alternate servicemen."1
Although the denial or granting of veterans' educational benefits
is clearly of great significance to an individual, the court's refusal to
44
This test must still be considered in any equal protection case, because the expanded rational relation standard, which Gunther suggests was the approach being
adopted by the Burger court, was not intended to replace strict scrutiny in cases involving fundamental interests or suspect classifications. Gunther, supra note 23, at 24.
45352 F. Supp. at 854-55.
46 Id. at 856.
47Id.
48 Id.
49
Text accompanying notes 26-41 supra.
5OSee Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.

184, 196 (1964).
51 Significantly, the court did not conclude that no fundamental interest or suspect
classification was involved. Rather, it said that it could not "conclude that education is,
for purposes of selecting the standard of review, a so-called fundamental interest." 352
F. Supp. at 854. And it spoke of its "hesitancy" to find a suspect classification, concluding simply that it was "not fully persuaded that the legislation results in a 'suspect
classification." Id. (emphasis added).
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fmd a fundamental interest in the claimed benefits is sound. Even
though, as the Supreme Court has unanimously recognized, "education
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments, '52 it is not a fundamental interest for purposes of examination
under the equal protection clause.5
The Robison court's hesitancy to characterize the classification
as suspect is less supportable. While the Supreme Court has not extended the suspect classification doctrine beyond classifications based
on race, alienage, and national ancestry, several commentators have
suggested that religious classifications might be so characterized. 4
That suggestion receives strong support from first amendment principles and from the policy considerations which form the basis of the
suspect classification doctrine.
The first amendment commits the government to a policy of
neutrality with respect to religion, 55 and the courts have depended
upon that commitment to require that a compelling state interest be
shown to justify any burden on the free exercise of religion.5 6 In some
cases of unequal treatment of religious groups, courts have found it
more appropriate to implement the policy of neutrality under the
guarantee of equal protection than under that of free exercise.5 7 The
religious nature of the claim, of course, remains the same under either
analysis. It is only reasonable, therefore, that any inequality of treatment of religious groups, which would constitute a "burden" in first
amendment language, should be held to the same compelling state
interest standard when it is scrutinized in equal protection terms. 58
52
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). It should be noted, however, that Brown dealt only with lower education, which the court noted plays a
special role in the development of good citizens. Id.
53 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1298 (1973).
"Education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." Id. at 1297.
54 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 20, at 356; Developments, supra note 23, at 1127.
55 See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1962); id. at 30506 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
56 See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
57
E.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (An ordinance was applied to
penalize a minister of the Jehovah's Witnesses for holding a religious meeting in a
public park, but to allow other religious groups to conduct services there. justice
Frankfurter, concurring, took the position that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, not the first amendment, condemned the application of the
ordinance. Id. at 70); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (the denial of
Jehovah's Witnesses' application for permits to use a city park was a violation of the
"right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and
religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ." Id. at 272). In
these cases of unequal treatment, plaintiffs alleged that they were denied access to a
particular privilege on an equal basis with other religious groups. In those cases which
can best be viewed only as free exercise (burden) cases, on the other hand, claimants
did not allege unequal treatment; rather, they claimed that conditions imposed on the
general populace constituted unfair burdens on them because of their religious beliefs.
58In Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), which involved a freedom of
speech-equal protection claim, the Court applied a test of "substantial governmental
interest." See text accompanying notes 68-73 infra. It is unclear from justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court how the test differs from the compelling state interest test.
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The policies behind strict scrutiny of some classifications were
set forth most clearly by Judge Skelly Wright in Hobson v. Hansen:
Judicial deference to [legislative and administrative] judgments is predicated in the confidence courts have that they
are just resolutions of conflicting interests. This confidence
is often misplaced when the vital interests of the poor and of
racial minorities are involved. For these groups are not always assured of a full and fair hearing through the ordinary
political processes, not so much because of outright bias, but
because of the abiding danger that the power structure--a
term which need carry no disparaging or abusive overtones-may incline to pay little heed to even the deserving
interests of a politically voiceless and invisible minority. 9
Justice Stone, in setting forth these same considerations in his footnote
in United States v. Carolene Products Co., mentioned religious minorities as one of the "discrete and insular minorities" possibly deserving
of extra protection through "more searching judicial inquiry."6 As
long as willingness to fight in a nation's wars is seen as the ultimate
expression of patriotism, it is difficult to imagine a religious minority
more in need of such protection than one which holds the unorthodox
view that participation in any war is immoral.
The Robison court gave essentially two reasons for its refusal to
find a suspect classification. First, explaining that it found no violation
of free exercise, the court was "hesita[nt] to give an essentially
religious group special treatment at the back door of equal protection.""' Once the court's misapplication of free exercise principles
is recognized,62 however, it becomes clear that the application of a
compelling state interest standard to any inequality of treatment does
not constitute special treatment. The choice of equal protection over
free exercise doctrine reflects a belief that the former offers a more
convenient framework of analysis than does the latter, not that the
interests involved are any less important or likely to -be disregarded.
The compelling state interest test is appropriate under either analysis.
Second, the court felt that the application of a doctrine based on
possible prejudice against or voicelessness of a minority was inapposite
to a case in which Congress carved out for that minority an exemption
from military service which was not constitutionally required. 63 AcGO269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
60304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
61352 F. Supp. at 855.
62 See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
63352 F. Supp. at 855. A tenable argument can be made that the exemption of
conscientious objectors from military service is required. See, e.g., Brodie & Southerland,
Conscience, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court: The Riddle of United States v.
Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. Rav. 306, 319-27; Freeman, Exemption from Civil Responsibilities,

1144

UZIVVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:1133

knowledging that the exemption may have reflected a legislative judgment that conscientious objectors could not be trained for military
duty, the court believed it "equally plausible that the exemption reflects a congressional determination to respect individual conscience."0 4
The latter suggestion may be true, but it does not follow that a Congress unwilling to force an individual to violate the dictates of his
conscience would distribute benefits to that individual on an equal
basis with an otherwise similarly situated individual whose beliefs
are more orthodox. Therefore, it may be appropriate to treat conscientious objectors as a voiceless minority deserving of special judicial
protection.' 5

2. Heightened Scrutiny under a
Sliding Scale Approach to Equal Protection
The~suspect classification argument is a convincing one, but the
Court may be hesitant to add to the list of suspect classifications,
possibly because of its preference for a multifactor sliding scale approach to equal protection. Even so, this statute's effect of "deny[ing]
important benefits to a discrete minority""0 "characterized by their
firm beliefs in opposition to war"11 should lead the Court to impose
some heightened standard of review.
In striking down an antipicketing ordinance which excepted only
peaceful labor picketing from its ban, Justice Marshall's opinion for
the Court in Police Department v. Mosley"" presented a test designed
for "all equal protection cases:" "whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment. 69
20 OHmo ST. L.J. 437, 444-53 (1959); Hochstadt, The Right to Exemption From Military Service of a Conscientious Objector to a Particular War, 3 HAIv. Civ. RIGHTSCirv. Lm. L. REv. 1, 37-50 (1967); Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine
Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. Rav. 1355, 1389-93 (1968). But the Supreme
Court has consistently indicated that the exemption is not constitutionally required.
See Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 266-68 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring); United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931), overruled on other grounds, Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90
(1918).
64 352 F. Supp. at 855.

65 An additional reason for the court's hesitation to employ strict scrutiny was
the fact that the equal protection claim was asserted under the fifth amendment, not
the fourteenth amendment. The court was "loathe to adopt the simplistic compelling
interest approach" developed in fourteenth amendment cases to legislation "one of
whose stated purposes stems from the explicit constitutional power to raise armies." Id.
But the suggestion that federal legislation should not be held to the same standard of
equal protection scrutiny is untenable. The importance of Congress' purpose is a factor
which will clearly influence the outcome of compelling interest analysis, but it should
not be a factor in determining whether or not that analysis should be applied. This argument of the court reflects the same misunderstanding of compelling interest analysis
as did the court's argument against applying the Sherbert test, see text accompanying
notes 15-16 supra.
66 352 F. Supp. at 856.

6T Id. at 855.
68408 U.S. 92 (1972).

69 Id. at 95.
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But the Justice noted that the equal protection claim in Mosley was
"closely intertwined with First Amendment interests"70 and concluded
that the state's justifications for the differential treatment "must be
carefully scrutinized."171 When referring specifically to the case at
hand, he required that any discrimination among pickets "be tailored
to serve a substantialgovernmental interest."7 2 Whether or not Justice
Marshall considered the "substantial governmental interest" standard
as a particularized, heightened form of the general "appropriate governmental interest" standard is not clear. But the opinion seemed to
contemplate some form of heightened scrutiny in equal protection
cases involving first amendment interests, and the shift in language
(from "appropriate" to "substantial") suggests that the interest served
by a classification involving first amendment rights must be more
important than the minimal interest which would justify non-first
amendment classifications. This particular form of heightened scrutiny
would be of no help to the Robison plaintiffs, since the governmental
interest which saves the classification under rational relation analysisto make military service more attractive--is certainly a substantial
one.
Any equal protection analysis, however, requires a twofold examination of the nature of the alleged state interest and the relationship
of the classification to that interest; under heightened scrutiny, this
latter examination should be intensified. Both the Mosley Court and
the Robison court acknowledged this aspect of heightened scrutinyJustice Marshall requiring that the ordinance be "narrowly tailored"
to its objectives,7 and Judge Garrity suggesting that "the court could
place on the defendants the burden of showing a high degree of relevancy between the exclusion.., and the stated purpose of the legislation.' 7 4 In considering multipurpose statutes, a court applying this
type of heightened scrutiny might require that the relationship between the classification and at least one of its purposes be stronger
than merely "rational," or that the purpose to which the classification
is related (rationally or otherwise) be the primary one. More specifically, the general requirement that classifications, such as the one in
Robison, bear a high degree of relevancy to some legitimate purpose
could be formulated in any one of four ways: (1) the classification
must bear a rational relation to the primary purpose; (2) the classification must affirmatively promote the primary purpose; (3) if the
classification is not rationally related to one of the purposes, it must
affirmatively promote at least one of the other purposes; (4) if the
701d.

71Id. at 99.
72 Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 102.
731d. at 101.
74
352 F. Supp. at 896.
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classification is not rationally related to the primary purpose, it must
affirmatively promote at least one of the secondary purposes.
The first of these alternatives, that the classification bear a rational relation to the primary purpose, removes from Congress the
option of excluding, on the basis of some secondary purpose, some of
those who are similarly situated with respect to the primary purpose;
that is, it forbids classifications which are underinclusive with respect
to the primary goal. Such a restriction on legislative action would be
reasonable in some situations, but its requirement that a court inquire
into which of several purposes was the primary one may render the
first formulation unworkable as a general rule.7

5

The second formula-

tion, that the classification affirmatively promote the primary purpose,
is overly broad, because it eliminates the requirement that all those
included in a class be similarly situated. The third and fourth alternatives offer the legislature the opportunity to justify the exclusion of
some of those who are similarly situated with respect to one purpose,
if their exclusion affirmatively promotes some other purpose. The
fourth approach, which requires stronger justification only for those
exclusions which are not rationally related to the primary purpose
is the least demanding of the four forms of heightened scrutiny. As
with the first alternative, the problem of uncertainty as to the primary
goal is not insurmountable.
The district court opinion in Robison can be affirmed under any
of the four approaches. The narrowest ground on which Robison can
rest is that, in cases involving the distribution of important benefits,
the equal protection guarantee prohibits religious classifications which
are not rationally related to the primary statutory purpose (compensation for interference with career plans) and which do not affirmatively promote the secondary purpose (making military service more
attractive). This statement of the holding indicates that although the
Robison court purported to apply a rational relation test, it actually
adopted the fourth formulation of heightened scrutiny.
III.

CONCLUSION

Because of the Robison court's misapplication of the traditional
rational relationship test, its acknowledgment that some form of heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in evaluating the exclusion of alternate servicemen from eligibility for veterans' benefits becomes significant. This. Comment has suggested that the religious nature of the
exclusion demands stricter scrutiny-whether in the form of the com75
However, the primary goal is usually evident, and in cases in which a court is
uncertain as to which purpose is primary, the classification could be required to bear a
rational relationship to any or all of the "primary" goals.
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pelling state interest test required to sustain suspect classifications, or
some rigorous test which reflects the significance of the classification's
distinguishing characteristic (religious belief) on a sliding scale of
equal protection.
Under either of these approaches, it is quite reasonable to conclude that the exclusion of alternate servicemen constitutes a denial
of equal protection. Given the similarity of the two classes of servicemen with respect to the conditions which the benefits were designed
to remedy, any other conclusion would be a denial of the principles
of government neutrality toward religion and equal treatment of those
who are similarly situated.

